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Introduction
In this paper we put forward a novel approach, based on the theory of ‡ow networks, 1 for the analysis of direct contagion in networks of agents connected among themselves by …nancial obligations. Financial contagion is broadly de…ned as the transmission of …nancial distress across agents, sectors or regions of the economy. The literature has distinguished among three di¤erent forms of …nancial contagion, also known as systemic risk, corresponding to di¤erent possible channels of propagation: 2 1) Informational contagion, that can occur in banking systems,where depositors'expectations about the possibility of a crisis can lead to bank runs, and in imperfectly informed …nancial markets, where 'bad news'can a¤ect the sentiments of the traders; 2) Direct contagion transmitted via networks of …nancial obligations. In banking and …nancial systems, such networks arises from three sources: i) loans and deposits in the interbank money market, ii) 'over-the-counter'trading in assets and derivatives, and iii) payment systems; while, in the manufacturing sector, networks of …nancial obligations arise from trade credit. 3 3) Common exposure to losses in the value of assets, losses that can be exogenous or endogenous to a …nancial network, the latter being the case of …re sales of illiquid assets induced by liquidity shortages. In this paper we forego informational contagion, as well as any analysis of agents'behaviour, and focus on the mechanics of direct balance-sheet contagion using a framework that takes common 1 See Ahuja et al. (1993) for a reference book on the theory of ‡ows and ‡ow network. 2 See the review articles by Dow (2000) and by De Bandt-Hartmann (2000) . 3 See Kiyotaki-Moore (2001 , 2002 2 exposures into account.
We represent a …nancial system as a ‡ow network -i.e., a directed and weighted graph endowed with source nodes and sink nodes -and use the properties of network ‡ows to analyse the dynamics of the ‡ows of losses that propagate, in a …nancial system, as a consequence of an external shock. Flow network theory is a branch of graph theory that, starting with the works of nineteen century physicists such as Gustav Kircho¤, has been progressively developed and applied to a vast number of …elds, ranging from telecommunication to electrical and hydraulic engineering, transportation, computer networking, industrial and military logistics, etc. To the best of our knowledge, the present work is the …rst application of network ‡ow analysis to economics or …nance. 4 The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the literature related to this work. In section three, we de…ne a …nancial system in terms of a ‡ow network.
In section four, we model the domino e¤ect of direct balnce-sheet contagion as a ‡ow of losses that crosses a …nancial ‡ow network, i.e., as a contagion function that associates, to the links of a network, the …nancial losses induced by an exogenous shock. Existence and uniqueness of such a contagion function are discussed in section …ve, where we address a known problem of indeterminacy that arises from the intercyclicity of payments in …nancial networks. We identify necessary and su¢ cient conditions for uniqueness and, in section six, we embed this result in an algorithm that, while computing a contagion function, controls for possible indeterminacies due to the interciclycity of obligations. In section seven, we investigate the relation between the structure of a …nancial networksi.e., the size and the pattern of the …nancial obligations that form the network -and its exposure to default contagion. For some classes of networks -such as the complete, starshaped, incomplete regular and cycle-shaped networks -we characterise the …rst and …nal thresholds of contagion, i.e., the value of the smallest shock capable of inducing default contagion and the value of the smallest shock capable of inducing the default of all agents 4 The only other papers that use a ‡ow network representation of a …nancial network are Castiglionesi and Eboli (2012) and Pokutta et al. (2011) . Castiglionesi and Eboli apply the framework of the present paper to analyse the ‡ows of liquidity in interbank deposit networks. They compare the performace of complete, circular and star-shaped networks in re-allocating liquidity among banks in the aftermath of a shock. Pokutta et al. model a …nancial network as a ‡ow network with the aim of measuring the systemic risk induced by single banks. In so doing these authors do not use ‡ow analysis in a strict sense, they use the linear program that maximises the ‡ows of payments within a network. Moreover, these authors avoid the indeterminacy problem depicted below by taking the largest possible clearing payment vector as the unique 'default adverse'clearing vector and provide informal arguments in support of this choice. in the network, respectively. For generic networks we show that, under a mildly restrictive condition, the exposure to default contagion of a network -both in terms of contagion thresholds and of number of defaults induced by a shock -monotonically depends on the ratio between the values of the external debt and of the intra-network obligations of the agents in the network. Conclusions are drawn in section seven. Finally, the proofs of the theorems, lemmae and corollaries presented in the paper are collected in the Appendix.
Related literature
This work has been inspired by Eisenberg and Noe (2001) , a seminal contribution which has provided the analytical basis and the computational tool to many authors (see the below cited papers) who perform numerical simulations to study direct contagion. Their paper and the present one study the properties of the same object -a directed and wighted graph that represents a …nancial system -resorting to two di¤erent analytical approaches: we use ‡ow networks while Eisenberg and Noe resort to matrix algebra and lattice theory. These authors investigate the domino e¤ect generated by the default of agents that participate in a single payment system. In so doing, they study the existence and the uniqueness of a vector of payments that clears a network of interdependent …nancial claims, where the capability of an agent to repay in full his debts depends on the solvency of his own debtors which, in turn, depends on the solvency of their debtors, and so forth. They express such a vector as a function of the operating cash ‡ows of the members of the …nancial network. This function is de…ned on a lattice, representing such a …nancial system, and complies with the requirements of limited liability, debt priority and pro-rata reimbursements. A recent contri Eisenberg and Noe, as well as the present paper, do not investigate agents'behaviour in a …nancial network and focus on the mechanics of contagion as governed by the rules of limited liability, debt priority and pro-rata reimbursements. This marks a major di¤erence with respect to theoretical analyses of direct …nancial contagion -due to Rochet-Tirole (1996) , Freixas et al. (2000) , Allen and Gale (1998, 2000) -that take explicitly into account the behaviour of banks and depositors. These authors use models of contagion in interbank liquidity networks based on, or inspired to, the seminal paper by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , where the uncertainty about the timing or the location of consumers' expenditure -hence, of depositors'withdrawals -generates the risk of liquidity shortages for the banks. In order to insure against such a liquidity risk, and in absence of perfectly functioning 'ex-post'liquidity markets, each bank holds deposits in other banks forming, in so doing, an interbank network of short-term exposures. This network serves the purpose of sharing liquidity risk and of re-allocating liquidity across banks, de facto moving customers' deposits from banks in liquidity surplus towards banks in liquidity de…cit. In case of default of a bank, though, the same network becomes a channel of transmission of …nancial losses towards the other banks in the network, creating the possibility of systemic crisis. The initial failure of one or more banks, capable of generating a widespread …nancial crises, can be due to exogenous causes, as it is in Allen and Gale (1998) , where …nancial crises arise as a consequence of downturns in the economic cycle. Recessions can cause losses in the value of the assets held by banks, losses capable of rendering them insolvent. If depositors foresee the recession, they will protect themselves from possible bank defaults by withdrawing their deposits and, in so doing, they create the conditions for the occurrence of a widespread crisis. Financial contagion can also originate from liquidity crisis. In Allen and Gale (2000) the failure of a bank is due to an idiosyncratic shortage of liquidity that forces the bank to liquidate long-term assets, incurring the costs of such '…re sales'. They show that a 'complete'network -a network where all banks are equal to one another, all have mutual bilateral obligations and of the same amount -is more robust than an incomplete network, i.e., a network with fewer links among the banks. the most robust and obtain a result, very close to our theorem 5 below, that shows the robust-yet-fragile nature of such a network structure. As the autors put it: "One of our main results is that that as the magnitude or the number of negative shocks cross certain thresholds, the types of …nancial networks that are most prone to contagious failures change dramatically. In particular, more …nancial interconnections are no longer a guarantee for stability. Rather, in the presence of large shocks, interbank liabilities facilitate …nancial contagion and create a more fragile system. Our results show that, in the presence of large shocks, "weakly connected" …nancial networks -for example, one consisting of a collection of pairwise connected banks with only a minimal amount of shared assets and liabilities with the rest of the system -are signi…cantly less fragile than the more complete The above mentioned theoretical papers investigate the relation between the shape of a network and its exposure to systemic risk resorting to stylized examples. 5 This has been perceived as a shortcoming of such a stream of literature. As Upper (2007 , page 2 and 3) puts it "Unfortunately, analytical results on the relationship between market structure and contagion have been obtained only for a limited number of highly stylised structures of interbank markets, which are of limited use when it comes to assessing the scope for contagion in real world banking systems.[...] Given the scarcity of theoretical results, researchers have increasingly turned to computer simulations to study contagion."Upper refers to several authors who, in order to assess the robustness of di¤erent network structures, have studied the mechanics of default contagion using numerical simulations, foregoing the mi- version of the present paper. 7 Using a computing device, these authors generate random banking networks, in the fashion of the random graphs a là Erd½ os-Rényi, and use them to run numerical simulations aiming at evaluating the exposure to systemic risk of di¤erent network structures.
The …nancial ‡ow network
The purpose of a …nancial system is the intermediation of the supply of funds provided by …nal claimants -that we will generically label as 'households', who hold shares, bonds and deposits -and the demand expressed by the …nal users of funds, such as companies, mortgage holders, governments, etc. Let such a system be composed by a set of …nancial intermediaries = f! i g ; i = 1:::n, which are directly or indirectly connected to one another by …nancial obligations, namely bonds and deposits, and let d ij 2 R + be the amount of debt, if any, that agent i owes agent j. Each agent in is characterized by its own balance sheet. On the asset side, let a i 2 R + be the value of the sum of external assets owned by ! i , which are liabilities of agents -the …nal users of funds -who do not belong to , let A = fa k g; k = 1:::m, be the set of external assets such that each a k in A appears in the balance sheet of at least one operator in ; and let a k i 2 R + be the amount of asset k held by agent i, if any. Besides the external assets, an agent ! i can hold internal assets which are liabilities of other agents in ; and let c i = P j d ji be the sum of the such assets held by agent i: On the liability side of the balance sheet, let d i 2 R + be the sum of the debts that ! i owes to households and to agents in ; in the possible forms of bonds, loans and deposits:
where h i is the external debt of ! i , i.e., the amount of debt claims against ! i held by households, and P j d ij is the internal debt of agent i; i.e., the claims against ! i held by other members of . For simplicity, we assume that all debts have the same seniority. Finally, the value of the equity of the i-th agent, e i , is set by the budget identity e i a i + c i d i h i . We assume that the value of the external assets is set by the market and take the other balance sheet headings c i ; d i ; h i , as well as the debts d ij ; at their nominal values. For the sake of simplicity, we also assume that all the shares issued by the members of are held by households, i.e., there is no cross-holding of shares among the …nancial intermediaries.
We represent this …nancial system as a multisource network, i.e., a directed and connected graph, with some sources and two sinks, with links endowed with non-negative capacities. 8 Let N = ; A; T; H; L ; L A ; L T ; L H ; be a multisource network where:
1. = f! i g is the set of n nodes that represent the above de…ned …nancial intermediaries. 3. T is a sink, i.e., a terminal node with no outgoing links. This node represents the shareholders who own the equity of the agents in .
4. H is a sink node representing the households who hold debt claims, in the form of deposits and bonds, against the agents in .
5. L 2 is a set of ordered pairs of nodes in ; i.e., a set of directed links fl ij g representing the liabilities d ij ; where l ij starts from node ! i and ends in node ! j ; and l ij 2 L only if d ij > 0:
is a set of directed links, with start nodes in A and end nodes in , that connect the external assets to their owners, where l k i 2 L A only if a k i > 0. 7. L T = fl i T g is a set of directed links, with start nodes in and end node T . 8. L H = fl i H g is a set of directed links, with start nodes in and end node H. 9. : L ; L A ; L T ; L H ! R + is a map, called capacity function, that associates i) to each l ij the value of the corresponding liability d ij , ii) to each l k i the value of the corresponding asset a k i , iii) to each l i T the equity, e i ; of its start node ! i , and iv) to each l i H the external debt, h i , of its start node ! i :
We shall refer to N as a …nancial ‡ow network or, for brevity, as a network N , while we shall refer to a generic multisource network simply as a network.
Propagation of losses and defaults: the domino effect
We now use the above de…ned …nancial ‡ow network to model the process of direct …nancial contagion among the agents in as a ‡ow of …nancial losses that crosses N . This ‡ow is initiated by an exogenous negative shock that consists of a loss of value of some of the external exposures a k : To de…ne a shock, let b k 2 [0; 1] be a parameter that measures the fraction of the value of the asset a k which is lost. An exogenous shock is an assignment of value to the vector [b k ]; k 2 A; where at least one of its components assumes a strictly positive value. If b k > 0; then source node a k is activated and sends to its direct descendants in i.e., to the nodes ! i 2 such that l k i 2 L A a …nancial loss equal to b k a k i . The shock, i.e., the ‡ow of losses out of the source nodes, is a vector of scalars [b k a k ]. It what follows, we distinguish between common shock, that a¤ects more than an agent in ; from idiosyncratic shocks, i.e., shocks born by a single node only.
As a shock occurs, the involved source nodes release a ‡ow of losses into the network.
The propagation of these losses across N is governed by the rules of limited liability, debt priority and pro-rata reimbursement of creditors. When a node ! i su¤ers a loss, this loss is …rst absorbed by the net worth of the node. Only the residual loss, if any, is passed over to other nodes in . The losses that are o¤set by the equity of the agents in are born by households, in their capacity as shareholders, thus they exit from the ‡ow of losses that circulate across to end up directly into the sink T . To represent this property we introduce, for each node in ;an absorption function
where i is the total loss born by the i-th node, received from source nodes and/or from other nodes in . The variable i 2 (0; 1) measures the share of net worth lost by a node.
If a node ! i receives a positive ‡ow of losses, it sends to the sink an amount of its own equity equal to i e i .
The equity of a …nancial intermediary measures its absorption capacity. If the losses su¤ered by ! i are larger than its net worth, then this node is insolvent and sends the residual loss, i e i , to its creditors. For each node in , let
be its loss-given-default function. The variable b i 2 [0; 1] assumes a value of zero if the i-th operator is solvent, while it assumes a strictly positive value if the operator defaults. In the latter case, the assets of the insolvent node are liquidated and its creditors get a pro rata refund. We assume that this is done without delays and without incurring in bankruptcy costs. 9 The creditors fall into two categories: the direct descendants of ! i in -i.e., the nodes ! j 2 such that l ij 2 L ; also said children nodes of ! i -and the households who own claims, in the form of bonds and/or deposits, against ! i . The variable b i measures the fraction of the i-th agent's debt that is not recovered through liquidation, i.e., the lossgiven-default ratio of the failing agent. When the i-th agent becomes insolvent, households receive a loss equal to b i h i (if h i > 0), that ends into the sink H, while a node ! j which is a creditor of node ! i receives from the latter a loss equal to b i d ij : The loss born by a 9 Bankruptcy costs can be introduced in the model by adding extra sources of losses that get activated in case of defaults. These extra losses would (obviously) make the system more prone to widespread crisis without substantially altering the results presented below. 9 …nancial intermediary in is the sum of the losses, if any, received from its external and internal exposures:
As the occurrence of a shock causes an in ‡ow of losses into the system, the absorption and loss-given-default functions govern the propagation of such losses across the network by assigning a positive real value to each link in N:
and call this function a contagion in a network N .
Such a contagion function is a ‡ow in N . A ‡ow over a generic network is a vector valued function, de…ned over the links of the network, such that: i) for all the links in the network, the scalar associated to a link does not exceed its capacity; and ii) for all the nodes in the network which are neither a source node nor a terminal node, the divergence i.e., the di¤erence between the total ‡ow arriving at a node and the total ‡ow departing from such a node is null.
De…nition 2 Let G = ( ; L; s; t) be a network where: is a set of nodes, L 2 is a set of directed links, and s and t are the source and the sink node, respectively. Let
) be the set of the outgoing (incoming) links of a node ! i 2 . A function
The above de…ned contagion function is a ‡ow in a network N .
A ‡ow out of the sources of a network is feasible, also said legitimate, -i.e. it existsif it entirely reaches the sink. In the next section we …rst show that any contagion in N is feasible and then we pin down su¢ cient and necessary conditions for the uniqueness of a contagion.
5 Existence and uniqueness of a contagion function in a …nancial ‡ow network
Network capacity and feasibility of a contagion
Every network has an upper bound to its overall capacity to carry a ‡ow. The carrying capacity of a network is equal to the value of the largest ‡ow out of the sources that can cross the network and be entirely absorbed by the sink, i.e., the largest feasible ‡ow. In general, the carrying capacity of a network is smaller or equal to the absorbing capacity of its sink. Finding the feasible ‡ow of maximum value, for a given network, is a fundamental problem in the study of networks -known, in fact, as the maximum ‡ow problem. This problem has been addressed by the celebrated result of Ford and Fulkerson (1956) , known as the minimum cut-maximum ‡ow theorem. Before presenting this theorem, we need to introduce the notions of a cut and of its capacity. 
and of the set of backward links going in the opposite direction, L (U ) := l ij 2 L j ! i 2 U ; ! j 2 U .
The capacity of a cut is the sum of the capacities of its forward links: The maximum carrying capacity of a network is set by the cut which has the smallest capacity among all possible cuts of the network: Theorem 2 (Ford and Fulkerson, 1956) In every network, the largest value of a feasible ‡ow equals the capacity of a cut of smallest capacity.
This upper bound is always attainable in ‡ow networks which are somehow administrated to the end of maximising the ‡ow that goes from the sources to the sinks. This is the case of ‡ow networks such as pipeline systems or electrical networks, where the ‡ows are centrally controlled and the networks themselves are designed to achieve this end. More speci…cally, the achievement of the above de…ned maximum ‡ow is possible only if there are no ‡ows crossing the minimum cut backward, i.e., from the sink towards the sources. 10 This requisite implies that there are no cycle ‡ows crossing the cut. Such a condition is not guaranteed at all in a …nancial system, where the ‡ows of losses follow the rules of bankruptcy in a predetermined and decentralised fashion. Nonetheless, in a …nancial network the upper bound never binds a ‡ow of losses: the largest possible ‡ow out of the source nodes always reaches the sink. To establish this, we consider the scenario that is most unfavourable to the to forward transmission of a ‡ow: the case where, for all cuts in a network, all backward links are …lled to capacity. We then look at the net capacity of the cuts in N , that is the residual forward capacity (if any) of a cut when its backward ‡ow is maximal.
De…nition 3
The net capacity of a cut, U; U ; is the sum of the capacities of its forward links less the sum of the capacities of its backward links:
In a network N; the budget identities of the nodes in imply that the net capacity of all cuts is the same and equals the total value of the external assets: In other words, the net capacity of all cuts in N is equal to the the total exposure, of the …nancial system as a whole, towards the …nal users of funds: P A a k : Lemma 1, coupled with the maximum ‡ow-minimum cut theorem, delivers the following proposition:
The largest value of a feasible contagion de…ned in a network N is equal to the largest possible ‡ow out of the source nodes, i.e., the largest possible shock.
This means that, in a …nancial network N , the budget identities of the agents in guarantee the existence of all possible propagations, i.e., the propagations induced by all possible exogenous shocks.
Cycles and nominal indeterminacy of a contagion
The interdependence of obligations that constitutes the fabric of a …nancial network, can create problems of indeterminacy to the contagion function de…ned above: under some conditions the contagion induced by a given shock is not unique. In this section we pin down the conditions that create such indeterminacy and asses its scope and implications.
The problem of non-uniqueness of payment ‡ows in a …nancial network was …rst pointed out by Eisenberg and Noe (2001) . These authors explain the possible indeterminacy of the vector of payments that clears a network of interdependent …nancial claims with the following example: "Suppose the system contains two nodes, 1 and 2, both without any operating cash ‡ows. Moreover, each node has nominal liabilities of 1.00 to the other node.[...] In this example, any vector p t = t(1; 1), t 2 [0; 1]; is a clearing vector of the system" [Eisenberg and Noe, op.cit., page 249]. In this case, the ‡ow of payments that goes from node 1 towards node 2 depends only on the payments that node 1 receives from node 2, and vice versa, therefore they can reimburse each other with any payment comprises between zero and unity.
The origin of this indeterminacy lies in the joint and simultaneous determination of the losses of the agents that belong to a cycle of defaulting agents or, more precisely, to a strongly connected component (henceforth SCC) of defaulting agents. 11 If a set of defaulting nodes is strongly connected, the losses that these nodes pass to one another are cyclically interdependent, and their loss-given-default functions of are simultaneously determined, like in the above example of a cycle of two defaulting agents. This simultaneity can generate indeterminacy: Under the conditions that we identify below, the value taken on by a contagion in a SCC of defaulting agents is not uniquely de…ned. Such a simultaneity does not arise at all if the contagion unfolds only along simple paths (as opposed to cycles).
A contagion that does not generate cycle ‡ows -as it is always the case for a contagion that takes place in an acyclic network N -does not pose problems of non-uniqueness:
Lemma 2 A contagion in N is uniquely de…ned if it does not embed any cycle ‡ow, i.e., if it does not entail any SCC of defaulting agents.
It is the occurrence of SCC's of defaulting nodes that generates the cyclical interdependence of payments which, in turn, can render a contagion indeterminate. For our purposes, 11 A cycle in a directed graph is a directed path such that its start node and end node coincide. A directed path is a sequence of nodes, with a start node and an end node, such that for any two consecutive nodes, i and i + 1; these is a link going from i to i + 1. A directed graph is said to be strongly connected if there exists a directed path going from each node to every other node in the graph. A subgraph that is strongly connected is called a strongly connected component. In other words, two nodes, i and j; are in the same strongly connected component if and only if there exists a directed path from i to j and there exists a directed path from j to i. This indeterminacy, if it arises, has a limited scope. Any positive ‡ow of pro-rata reimbursements, in a closed SCC of failed agents, is simply a clearing transaction among its members, with no consequences on their own …nancial conditions. Moreover, and most important, this possible indeterminacy is con…ned to closed SCC's of defaulting nodes, it never a¤ects the values taken on by the contagion in the rest of the network. This is due to the fact that a closed SCC is a cul-de-sac: the losses that reach the nodes in such a SCC do not come out it, these losses are born by their shareholders only, ending up entirely into the sink T . This theorem re…nes the analogous result put forward by Eisenberg and Noe (2001) .
These authors demonstrate that, for a clearing payment vector to be uniquely de…ned, it is su¢ cient that all risk orbits in the network are surplus sets; where the risk orbit of a node is its set of descendants, and a surplus set is a set of nodes such that "no node in the set has any obligation to any node outside the set and the set has positive operating cash ‡ows" [Eisenberg and Noe, op. cit., page 241]. The authors also show that, for any clearing vector of payments, it is impossible for all nodes in a surplus set to have zero equity value, i.e., at least one node in the set does not default. In the light of the above theorem, we can replace this condition with a less restrictive one and state that, for a contagion in a network N to be uniquely de…ned, it is necessary and su¢ cient that all closed SCC's in N;
if any, are surplus sets.
A useful consequence of the above theorem is that the occurrence of closed SCC's of defaulting agents in N is unequivocally revealed by the value taken on by a contagion function on the links in LnL . The above theorem implies that the ‡ow of losses received by a closed SCC is uniquely de…ned. Moreover, to cause the failure of all the agents that form a closed SCC, the ‡ow of losses that reach such a SCC must be maximal -i.e., it must be equal to the total exposure, of the SCC as a whole, towards the rest of the network.
Corollary 1 Let S = (S; L(S)) 2 be a closed SCC in N: All nodes in S default if and only if the ‡ow of losses that reaches S from the rest of the network -i.e., the ‡ow across the partition (A; nS); S -is maximal, i.e.:
This implies that, in computing a contagion, the occurrence of the conditions that cause the above described indeterminacy can be detected unambiguously by monitoring the ‡ow that reaches the closed SCC's in N , as it is done in the algorithm presented below.
Computing a contagion process
An algorithm that computes a contagion f in N must perform two tasks: calculate f and check for possible indeterminacies, i.e., monitor the occurrence of closed SCC's of insolvent agents. This can be done as follows.
In calculating f , we add a superscript t = 1; 2; 3; ::: to the variables involved in the computation -namely t i ; b t i ; t i -to indicate the value taken on by these variables at each iteration of the algorithm.
be the vector of the losses born by the agents in : Then:
1. For a given value assignment of the vector
starting with t = 1 and setting b 0 (1) and (2); 6. for every S in , de…ne the matrix of the coe¢ cient of the system of equations used in part (1) The …rst three steps of this algorithm calculate, for a given shock vector [b k ] ; the value of the contagion f through the iterated application -node by node, along the directed paths of N -of the absorption and loss-given-default functions, i ( i ) and b i ( i ), de…ned above.
The values of the vectors [ t i ]; [ t i ]; [b t i ] computed in step 1 and 2, are strictly increasing in t as long as there are nodes in with strictly positive divergence, i.e., as long as there exists at least one i 2
Conversely, the repeated iteration of the algorithm yields stationary values of the vectors at hand once the ‡ow out of the sources has been entirely absorbed by the sinks, i.e., when have imposed rules, known as "large exposure rules", to limit the credit exposures of banks towards single borrowers and increase the diversi…cation of their portfolio. Both the Basel I and the Basel II committees have recommended this sort of controls on credit risk. 13 In setting an upper limit to single loans -usually linking the size of a loan to some measure of the capital of the lending bank -these measures also imply a growth in the number of debt/credit relations existing in a …nancial system, i.e., a growth in the connectivity of the …nancial network. At the same time, in several countries, the authorities have encouraged mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector, leading to more concentrated systems with fewer and larger operators. In most cases this policy has reinforced, if not generated, twotiers banking systems where few large operators act as money centers, i.e., each of them is connected to many small banks which, in turn, are not connected among themselves.
Whether this policies have rendered …nancial systems more or less resilient to withstand systemic shocks, given the structural changes that they brought along, is a question that does not have an obvious answer.
In what follows, we investigate the fact that di¤erent networks propagate losses in di¤erent fashions. The e¤ects of a shock on a network N depend on the two elements that form its structure: a) the shape of the network, i.e. the pattern formed by the links in L ; and b) the values of the assets and liabilities of the agents in the network, i.e., the capacities of the links in L . We study the e¤ects of these two determinants of a contagion separately, beginning with the former.
In this section we focus our attention on the e¤ects of external shocks that cause the 
Thresholds of default contagion
We take into consideration three types of network structures: the complete, the unilateral circle (also know as the wheel), and the star network. We focus on these three stylised structures because they are, respectively, neat examples of networks which are dense, sparse and scarcely centralised, and sparse and highly centralised. 14 To evaluate and compare the contagiousness of di¤erently shaped networks, we look at two characteristics of a network: the …rst and the …nal thresholds of contagion.
De…nition 6
The …rst threshold of contagion of a network N; 1 (N ); is the magnitude of the smallest shock that is large enough to cause secondary defaults. Correspondingly, the …nal threshold of contagion of a network, 2 (N ); is the value of the smallest shock that is capable of inducing the failure of all nodes in the network.
Moreover, and unless otherwise speci…ed, we assume that: i) all agents in the networks are equal to one another; ii) all links in L have the same weight, i.e., the debt of each node towards any other node in a network is equal to d ij for all l ij 2 L : 
This result shows that the complete network, on one hand, is entirely resilient to relatively small shocks, i.e. faces no defaults for shocks smaller than c . On the other hand, for large enough shocks -larger than or equal to c -this network induces a complete system melt down. The same applies to the star-shaped network, if the central node is in the set of primary defaults, as shown below. 
Incomplete networks
A generic incomplete network is a network such that the cardinality of the set of links L is not maximal, i.e. there is at least a pair of nodes wich are not directly connected to one another. The …rst and …nal thresholds of an incomplete network can not be characterised, unless some restrictions are imposed on their structure -as it is done below with the cycle and star-shaped networks which are, obviously, incomplete networks themselves. Thus, for the sake of tractability, we focus the attention on incomplete networks which are regular,
i.e. where the indegree and outdegree of each node are equal. 15 We failed to identify the …rst and the …nal threshold of an generic shock in a incomplete regular network. The be such that L = fl pc ; l cp jp = 1; 2; :::; n 1g :We assume that all links in L have the same weight, i.e., d cp = d pc = d p , for all links in L .
In a star-shaped network, the contagion thresholds depend on the distribution of the initial shock between the center and the periphery of the network. We obtain results for the three possible cases: 1) the shock is idiosyncratic and borne by the central node alone: is such that L = fl ij ji = 1; 2; :::; n; j = i + 1 for i = 1; :::; n 1, and j = 1 for i = ng : As above, assume that all links in L have the same weight, i.e., d ij = d i ; and all nodes have the same balance sheet, a i + c i = e i + h i + d i : In this network, the e¤ects of an external shock that involves more than one agent, jD 0 j > 1, crucially depend on the position that such defaulting nodes have on the cycle network. In order not to resort to implausible restrictions on this issue, we content ourselves with the analysis of the impact of idiosyncratic shocks.
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Theorem 8 The …rst threshold of contagion, o 1 ; and the last threshold of contagion, o 2 ; of an idiosyncratic shock in a cycle-shaped network N s are the following:
Comparing the contagion thresholds of di¤erent network structures
For the sake of comparability, we set the four types of networks considered here to be composed by the same number of agents, n; and to be endowed with the same total stock of equity, E = P i2 e i , and with the same total external debt, H = P i2 h i . In order to isolate the e¤ects that the shape of a network has on its contagion thresholds from the e¤ects that the balance sheet ratios e i =h i and h i =d i have on such thresholds, we set these ratios to be the same for all agents in all networks. 17 Under these conditions we have the following 2. The …rst contagion thresholds of the cycle-shaped network, o 1 ; and of the incomplete regular network, r 1 ; are such that:
These results show that:
1. In complete networks, as well as in star-shaped networks (when the center is in the set of primary defaults), the …rst and the …nal thresholds coincide. The rationale of this result stems from the fact that, in both these classes of networks, the losses that over ‡ow from the primary defaults are evenly spread among all the nodes which 17 This restriction implies that i) the banks in the complete, incomplete and cycle-shaped networks all have the same balance sheet a i + c i = e i + h i + d i , and ii) in the star-shaped network, the balance sheet of the peripheral nodes is equal to a p + c p = e p + h p + d p while the balance sheet of the central nodes is equal to a c + c p (n 1) = e c + h c + d p (n 1); where e c = (n 1)e p and h c = (n 1)h p :
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are not in the set of initial defaults. In these networks no secondary defaults occur when the system is perturbed by shocks smaller than the unique contagion threshold, while all agents in these networks default if it is hit by a shock larger than such a threshold. In other words, these network structures are robust yet fragile: they are resilient to relatively small shocks and, at the same time, they are exposed to the risk of a collapse of the entire …nancial network, if hit by a su¢ ciently large shock. 18 2 : This implies that the class of incomplete regular networks (which includes the cycle-shaped ones), compared to complete and starshaped networks, is more exposed to episodes of contagion due to shocks of small magnitude, with limited and local default contagion.
Value of balance sheets headings and contagion thresholds
In the network structures analysed above, the only headings of the balance sheets of the agents that determine the contagion thresholds of a network are the stock of equity e and the h=d ratio between internal and external debt. Moreover, all the above characterised thresholds are increasing in the equity endowments, e, and in the h=d ratio. The protective role played by the equity stock is not surprising: the larger the equity of the members of a 18 The robust-yet-fragile nature of the complete networks has been pointed out also by Acemoglu et al (2013) . network, the larger the amount of losses that can be absorbed by those agents, the higher the contagion thresholds of the network (and, of course, the smaller the set of defaults induced by any given shock).
The relevance of the h=d ratio, in turn, lies in the fact that this ratio governs the allocation of the ‡ow of losses, released by defaulting nodes, between external creditors (households) and internal ones (other nodes in ). The smaller this ratio between external and internal debt, the smaller the portion of losses that, at each default, is sent into the sink H; and the larger the ‡ow of losses that continues to circulate among the nodes in , and vice versa. Therefore, the smaller the h=d ratio: i) the larger the portion of an external shock that over ‡ows from the primary defaults towards the rest of the network;
ii) the smaller the smallest shocks capable of causing secondary defaults (the contagion thresholds), and iii) the larger the number of defaults induced by a shock. This is true, under a mildly restrictive condition, for all …nancial ‡ow networks. In order to establish this result, we restrict the attention to networks where each agent holds an amount of internal exposures, c i ; equal to its internal debt, d i ; and we vary the h=d ratio by varying proportionally the value of all intra-network obligations -the weights of the links inwhile keeping constant the value of the other balance sheet headings. The scope of these restrictions is discussed below.
De…nition 7 Let N be a …nancial ‡ow network such that c i = d i ; for all i 2 ; and let fN g be the set of …nancial ‡ow networks, indexed by 2 R + ; such that: i) all networks in fN g are equal to N in everything but the weights of the links in L ;ii) for all d ij in N;
Within this class of networks, and for any given shock, the ‡ow of losses that a defaulting agent passes to his creditors in is increasing in ; i.e. it grows as the h=d ratio diminishes. 19 Lemma 4 Let be an external shock to the networks in fN g and let D 0 be the set of primary defaults induced by . Let L D 0 = fl ij ji 2 D 0 ; j 2 g be the set of the outgoing links of the nodes in D 0 : Then the ‡ow of losses that crosses a link l ij 2 L D 0 in a network N ; as a consequence of a shock, is increasing in :
This result stems from the pro-rata allocation of losses among the debtors of defaulting agents: the relative growth of the internal debts with respect to the external debts of defaulting agents, transfers part of the losses from their external to their internal debtors.
As a consequence, the amount of losses that the primary defaults send to the other nodes in (the 'contagious' ‡ow), as well as the amount of losses that circulate among the nodes in D 0 , grow with ; while the ‡ow of losses sent to the sink H correspondingly diminishes with ": This means that the larger , the larger the ‡ow carried by each link across the cut (D 0 ; nD 0 ). Clearly this implies that the losses received by each creditor of the defaulting nodes in D 0 ; for any given shock, grow as increases. Thus, as grows, progressively smaller shocks are su¢ cient to induce contagion. For the same reason, the larger , the larger the number of defaults induced by a given shock. In sum, a proportional growth of the value of the intra-network obligations d ij 's, while the extra-network obligations h i 's remain …xed, renders a network increasingly exposed to default contagion, both in terms of thresholds and of scope of contagion:
Theorem 9 1. Let f 0 g and f 00 g be, respectively, the sets of …rst and of …nal contagion thresholds of the networks in fN g and let such sets be indexed by 2 R + : Then 0 and 00 are decreasing in :
2. Let be an external shock to the set of networks fN g and let fD g be the set, indexed by 2 R + ; composed of the sets of defaults induced by in the networks in fN g :
Then the number of defaults, i.e. the cardinality of D ; is increasing in :
These results are obtained under two restrictions: c i = d i ; for all i 2 ; and the proportionality of the above considered changes in the value of intra-network obligations.
The former restriction is merely a convenient way to ensure that the change in the value of the intra-network obligations is compatible with the balance sheet constraints. This restriction can be replaced without altering the above results. 20 Conversely, the latter restriction -that keeps the proportions among the intra-network obligations …xed while varying their values -is a necessary condition for lemma 21 because a non proportional change of such obligations may shift losses from poorly capitalized agents towards highly capitalized ones (or, with similar e¤ects, from defaulting nodes with a low h=d ratio to nodes with a high h=d ratio). 21 
Conclusions
In the last decade …nancial networks have became a crucial concern for central banks and policy makers. Even if economists and central bankers have devoted a good deal of attention to the study of …nancial networks, our knowledge of their properties is still limited. Financial networks, unfortunately, are complex mathematical objets and our understanding of their features is obstacled by the analytical di¢ culties. The ‡ow network framework presented in this paper has the ambition of contributing to the set of analytical tools that the literature on …nancial networks has been providing in the last years.
In this paper we represent a …nancial network as a ‡ow network and model the di¤usion of losses and defaults, originated by an exogenous shock, as a ‡ow that crosses such a network. Using some properties of network ‡ows, we obtain three sets of results. First, we address a know problem of non uniqueness of the clearing payments vector that arises from the possible existence of strongly connected components of defaulting agents. We establish necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the uniqueness of clearing intercyclical payments and use embed these conditions in an algorithm that computes the contagion process. Second, we investigate the relation between the shape of a …nancial networks and its exposure to default contagion. We characterise …rst and …nal contagion thresholds (i.e., the value of the smallest shock capable of inducing at least one default and the value of the smallest shock capable of inducing the default of all agents in the network, respectively) for di¤erent network shapes, namely the complete, star-shaped, incomplete regular, and cycle-shaped networks. We …nd that …rst and …nal thresholds coincide in complete networks, and the same applies to star-shaped networks (when the center is in the set of primary defaults) because, in both cases, the losses that over ‡ow from the primary defaults are evenly spread among all remaining nodes. This means that these network structures have a robust-yetfragile nature: they are very resilient to shocks of relatively small magnitude -in the sense that no default contagion occurs for shocks smaller than the unique contagion thresholdbut, at the same time, they are exposed to the risk of a complete melt-down, which occurs if they are hit by a su¢ ciently large shock. We also …nd that the …rst thresholds of incomplete regular and cycle-shaped networks are both smaller than the ones of complete networks.
the value of d 12 , while d 13 is kept constant, implies a shift of losses from ! 3 towards ! 2 and, therefore, implies an increase of the …rst (and last) contagion threshold of this simple network as well as, for some shock values, a decrease of the number of defaults. Thus, a non-proportional increase of intra-network obligations does not necessarily imply a larger exposition to default contagion.
28
This implies that the class of incomplete regular networks (which includes the cycle-shaped ones), compared to the classes of complete and star-shaped networks, is more exposed to episodes of contagion due to shocks of small magnitude and scope. Third, we …nd that the ratio between the external debt of the agents in a network (i.e. the debt towards claimants who do not belong to the network, such as households) and their internal debt (i.e. the debt towards other agents in the network) determines the exposure to contagion of the network. Ceteris paribus, the larger the ratio between the intra-network exposures and the external debt of the agents in a network, the more the network is exposed to default contagion, both in terms of scope and of thresholds of contagion.
Appendix: proofs of theorems, lemmae and corollaries
Proof of theorem 1. 1: The capacity constraint is satis…ed because
; for all i 2 and all k 2 A. 2: The budget identity of the balance sheets of the agents in ; together with the rules of limited liability and debt priority encoded in (1) and (2) ensure that any ‡ow of losses that arrives in a node is redirected …rst towards the sink and, for the residual part, towards the node's descendants in . In notation:
Proof of lemma 1. Let U i ; U i be a cut in N and let U i 1 ; U i 1 be another
Thus we can express the capacity of U i ; U i as 1) Let us assume that all nodes in S default. Each node ! i in S receives losses equal to
is the ‡ow of losses (if any) that ! i receives directly from the source nodes; P j = 2S b j d ji is the ‡ow of losses that it receives through its defaulting parent nodes that do not belong to S (if any); and P j2S b j d ji is the ‡ow of losses that ! i receives from its defaulting parent nodes that belong to S. For the time being, we resort to a simplifying assumption. We assume that f does not induce any cycle ‡ow along the directed paths that connect the source nodes in A to the members of S, i.e., there is no SCC of defaulting nodes laying between the source nodes and S. By 
For a SCC composed of m nodes, we have a system composed of m of such linear equations: The solution of this system -i.e., the vector of unknowns [b 1 ; b 2 ; :::; b m ]; hence the ‡ow values assigned by f to the links in L S -is indeterminate if and only if the matrix of the coe¢ cients of the system is singular. 22 The components of such a matrix have the following properties:
(1) d i P j2S d ij ; for every i 2 f1; 2; :::; mg ; (2) for every i; j 2 f1; 2; :::; mg ; if i 6 = j; then there exists a sequence of indexes i 1 ; i 2 ; :::; i k ; where i = i 1 and j = i k ; such that d i 1 i 2 d i 2 i 3 d i k 1 i k 6 = 0:
Property (1) holds with the equality sign for the nodes in S that are indebted only to other nodes in S. Thus, in a closed SCC we have that d i = P j2S d ij ; for every i 2 f1; 2; :::; mg : Conversely, in an open SCC we have that d i > P j2S d ij for at least one i 2 f1; 2; :::; mg : Property (2) is a formal expression of strong connectivity: for every ordered pair (! i ; ! j ) 2 S there exists a directed path that starts in ! i and ends in ! j . Now demonstrating the if part of the lemma is straightforward. If S is a closed SCC, then d i = P j2S d ij ; for every i 2 f1; 2; :::; mg : In this case the sum of the rows of the coe¢ cient matrix is null and so is its determinant.
In order to establish the only if part of the Lemma, we suppose that the determinant of the matrix is null and show that, in such a case, d i = P j2S d ij for every i 2 f1; 2; :::; mg ; which means that S is closed. We use the fact that the determinant of a matrix is null if and only if its rows are linearly dependent. Thus we suppose that there exist m real numbers 1 ; 2 ; :::; m not all null and such that, for every i; j 2 f1; 2; :::; mg ;
We can suppose, re-ordering the indexes if necessary, that j m j j i j for all i < m; thus 
together with condition (1) and with the fact that j i j is maximal, implies that i = j for every j such that d ij 6 = 0 and, therefore, that i = m = k ; contradicting the hypothesis that k < h: This proves that, if the determinant of the above coe¢ cient matrix is null, then all i are equal among themselves and, therefore, d i = P j6 =i d ij ; for every i; j 2 f1; 2; :::; mg : Finally, we can remove the above made simplifying assumption because i) by de…nition, no closed SCC can lie along the paths that go from A to S, and ii) the presence of an open SCC of defaulting agents along such paths does not cause any indeterminacy, as it is shown above. 2) It follows from lemma 10.
Proof of corollary 1. The total loss received by the nodes in S from the rest of the network is:
Aggregating the balance sheets of the members of S we obtain: 
2S d ji -then at least one of such agents has a strictly positive residual equity, i.e., it does not default.
In demonstrating theorem 5, 6 and 8 below, we resort to a known property of network ‡ows: for a ‡ow de…ned in a ‡ow network, the value of the net forward ‡ow that crosses a cut is the same for all the cuts of the network. Applying this property to a …nancial ‡ow network N , we obtain a convenient feature of a contagion f in N : the value of the net forward ‡ow that crosses all cuts of N equals the value of the exogenous shock, i.e., it is equal to the ‡ow that crosses the cut fA; ( ; H; T )g. Proof. See Diestel (2000) , page 126, for a proof that refers to generic ‡ow networks.
Proof of theorem 5. Lemma 5 ensures that the value of an exogenous shock, i.e., the ‡ow that crosses the cut fA; ( ; H; T )g ; is equal to the forward ‡ow that crosses the cut f(A; D 0 ); ( nD 0 ; T; H)g, which is also the net ‡ow across this cut, since no ‡ow crosses it in the opposite direction. Let m be the number of primary defaults caused by a shock [ b b k ], m = jD 0 j: Each of node ! i in D 0 sends 1) to the sink T a ‡ow equal to its own equity e;
2) to the sink H a ‡ow equal to b i h; and 3) a ‡ow equal to b i d ij to each of its (n m) creditors in nD 0 : The shock that comes out of the source nodes, ! f (A; ( ; H; T )); is then
where 1) me is the value of the ‡ow
from D 0 to the n m nodes in nD 0 : In a complete network N c , each node j in nD 0 receives, 34 from its defaulting debtors, a ‡ow of losses equal to
For default contagion to occur, this ‡ow of losses must be larger than or equal to the absorbing capacity of a node: P m i=1 b i d ij e j : The value of an exogenous shock that is exactly large enough to cause such a condition to be ful…lled, i.e., such that P m i=1 b i d ij = e j , constitutes both the …rst and the …nal threshold of contagion of a network N c : all nodes in nD 0 default together if such a threshold is reached. This condition for contagion requires that P m i=1 b i = e j =d ij and, substituting this value in (4), we obtain the …rst and …nal contagion thresholds of a network N c :
Proof of theorem 6. The proof is trivial and is omitted.
Proof of theorem 7. As above, lemma 5 ensures that the value of a shock, 
2) if D 0 = f! p jfor some p 2 (1; :::; n 1)g and ! c = 2 D 0 ; the ‡ow that crosses the cut f(A; D 0 ); ( nD 0 ; H; T )g is equal to
where me p and P m p=1 b p h p are the ‡ows that D 0 sends into T and H; respectively, and P m p=1 b p d p is the ‡ow that the central node ! c receives from the defaulting nodes in D 0 : The condition for the …rst threshold of contagion is: P m p=1 b p d p = e c ; hence P m p=1 b p = e c =d p and, substituting this into the above equation, we obtain that s 1 = me p + e c (1 + h p =d p ); The second and …nal threshold of contagion, is set by the ‡ow that crosses the cut 
As above, to obtain P m p=1 b p ; we resort to the fact that the ‡ow that enters the central node is equal to the ‡ow that exits from it: Substituting this value in (6), we obtain the above result.
Proof of theorem 8. 1. The proof is trivial and is omitted.
2. Let N o be composed by a cycle of nodes (! 1 ; ! 2 ; :::; ! n ) and suppose that N o is hit by an idiosyncratic shock borne by node ! 1 . ((A; n! n ); (! n ; H; T )) is the cut of N o corresponding to the …nal threshold of contagion of such a shock . The ‡ow across this cut is equal to
The smallest shock su¢ cient to cause the failure of the n-th node, is such that: b n 1 d i = e i ; hence: b n 1 = e i =d i : The …nal threshold at hand is then equal to
To obtain P n 2 i=1 b i ; we use the ‡ow conservation property: b i 1 d i = i = e i + b i h i + b i d i ; for all i = 2; :::; n; hence: 1 # e i + e i d i h i (n 2)e i 37 that, substituted in (7), yields the above result.
Proof of corollary2. Part (1) can be checked by inspection. In checking that c < s 2 ; it is convenient to rewrite these thresholds as follows:
Notice that the second addendum of the latter equation, E hp dp ; is larger than e i h i d ij . Part (2) also can be checked by inspection.
Part (3):
Proof of lemma 5.
The ‡ow that crosses an outgoing link l ij 2 L D 0 in a network N is equal to ( i e i ) [(1 + )d ij = (h i + (1 + ) d i )] and is increasing in for the following reason. As long as h i > 0; the term within square brackets is strictly increasing in : In turn, ( i e i ) is non-decreasing in because, for a given shock, the losses received by a node ! i 2 D 0 , i ; grow if there is at least one node ! j in D 0 such that: i) h j > 0; and ii) there exists a directed path from ! j to ! i where all nodes along such a path are insolvent as well. If either (i) or (ii) does not hold, then i remains constant as changes. Thus,
( i e i ) [(1 + )d ij = (h i + (1 + ) d i )] is increasing in and such monotonic relation is strict for all links l ij 2 L D departing from nodes ! i for which: (1) both (i) and (ii) hold, andnor
(2) h i > 0.
Proof of theorem 9. Both 1 and 2 are direct consequences of lemma 4, which implies that, for any given shock, the losses received by each creditor of the defaulting nodes are increasing (at least weakly) in . The formal proof is trivial and is omitted.
